This article studies a major e-commerce platform which introduced an online lending program for affiliated retailers in developing economies. Using data provided by the platform itself, I show that this product quickly became a primary source of funds for targeted small businesses and that the resulting improvement in credit access caused a concurrent increase in retailer revenue of 10 to 25%. I develop a model of information asymmetries between this platform, third-party lenders, and potential borrowers regarding the fundamental characteristics of retailer operations. Estimates indicate that there is positive latent correlation in the usage of online and bank loans and partial evidence of advantageous self-selection by retailers who accept online loan offers. Analysis of a counterfactual withdrawal of the platform’s lending product reveals an average increase of retailer revenue greater than its allocation of capital, highlighting the potential of similar platforms to relieve business-facing credit constraints in other settings.

Starting in 2016, Argentina introduced a battery of regulation to further domestic bancarization. Payment card systems were targeted by this policy but also under the suspicion that parties involved in the market were abusing a dominant position; government antitrust inquiry culminated in the introduction of a cap on interchange fees in debit and credit card transactions, together with the ongoing divestment of the single payment processor of the leading credit card network by transaction volume. A model of network effects is discussed to highlight the relevance of the market’s ownership structure in the determination of pass-through from interchange fees to other prices and of the overall efficacy of the designed regulation. Particularly, interchange fee regulation in a market with vertically integrated card service providers may lead to increased concentration and market power.

The European Union spends over 50 billion euros each year to subsidize projects in poorer regions of Europe. A large portion of these resources is allocated to public entities. Using a change in eligibility for subsidies we show that European subsidies significantly alter the portfolio of projects purchased by the public sector. There is, however, only limited evidence that public entities now acquire projects that have high externalities, such as investments into green energies or R&D, which are among the main targets of the European policy. We develop a dynamic model of procurement investment and show that simpler policies such as a lump-sum subsidy for poorer regions enhance efficiency.